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WITHIN RISK PARADIGM: IS PAKISTAN A RISK? 
Whether to risk- a taste for it or an aversion to it- is a meaningful way to explain 
decision making since it links the strategic and the psychological conceptions of 
choice.
3
 It portrays leaders as calculating goal-seekers while allowing them to have 
different personal decision making styles. One can call Khruschev risk-acceptant or 
risk-seeking and Brezhnev risk-averse without implying that either one was more 
rational than the other. In the same vein, one can argue that governing elite of 
Pakistan are risk takers perhaps to the point of brinkmanship. According to Utility 
theory suggested by de Finetti (1952) and developed by Arrow (1964), Pratt 
(1964), Goldgeier/Tetlock (2001), Berejikian (2002), Herrmann/Fischerkeller 
(1995), Hymans (2006), Mercer (2005), Hashmi/Lee (2004), etc,  the risk averse 
person will prefer not to gamble too hard and accept the best outcome at face value 
while risk taker will try to push the envelope too far to the point of brinkmanship 
for deriving maximum advantage or leverage.  Risk acceptance was attributed to 
Britain and France in their intervention in Suez (Richardson, 1992) and to 
Eisenhower in his deception about the U-2 over-flight (McDermott, 1998); while a 
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cautious decision was the United States staying out of the Suez crisis (McDermott, 
1998). This association of risk acceptance with riskier choice appears in Bueno de 
Mesquita's revised expected utility theory of war (1985) and its development by 
Morrow (1987). The idea is that a risk-averse state is one that chooses policies that 
reduce others' incentives to attack it. Jervis (1992) presents a prospect theory 
interpretation of crisis instability and suggests that because decisions are being 
made among losses in territory, reputation or domestic support, a leader intends to 
order a pre-emptive strike in cases in which the standard expected utility model 
would predict the actor to cut his losses to the minimum. Under this model, it is 
possible to ague that under extreme provocation and in an asymmetrical strategic 
environment vis-a-vis India, Pakistan‟s ruling elite, may adopt a policy of 
preemption as it may determine that it(Pakistan) has nothing more to lose by not 
going in for the first use of nuclear weapons. 
 
 
CONTEXTUALISING THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE 
Concept of deterrence assumes significance in military strategic discourse when 
one or the other state in the same regional neighborhood acquires nuclear weapons. 
Within deterrence literature, deterrence by denial, according to Glen Snyder, is 
premised on the failure of deterrence and the preparedness by the other party to this 
eventuality.
4
 The other version of the deterrence by denial is by denying the 
adversary the specific military advantage it might want to respond through an 
overwhelming force of its own. Michael Howard has defined deterrence as a policy 
that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the actual threat of military retaliation, 
that the costs of using military force to resolve political conflict will outweigh the 
benefits derived from it.
5
 Deterrence theory assumes that there is a certain measure 
of transparency of interests and capability inherent in a state‟s action and in its 
response in a given strategic situation that are of supreme national importance.  
 
In contrast, the theory of deterrence by punishment seeks to prevent 
aggression by threat of punitive retaliation. US strategic policy in the 1950s with its 
emphasis on massive retaliation and assured destruction are examples of deterrence 
by punishment.
6
  
 
In the context of South Asia, Pakistan‟s nuclear doctrine relies in part on both 
of these components: deterrence by denial as well as deterrence by punishment. 
What makes Pakistan‟s strategic policy bit ambiguous is neither of these concepts 
been articulated or explored fully to its operational limits vis-a-vis India‟s nuclear 
strategy.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Snyder, Glenn; Deterrence and Defense; Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961. 
5
 Howard, Michael; „Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Doctrine in the 1980s‟, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, 1982/83,  p.315; also, see, Rajain, Arpit. Nuclear Deterrence in 
Southern Asia, London: Sage Publishers, 2005, p.63. 
6
 Dulles, John Foster; „Challenge and Response in US Policy‟, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, 
No. 1, 1968, p. 62-64. also, see, McNamara, Robert S. The Essence of Security: Reflections 
in Office, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968, p. 52. 
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INDIA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND COMPARE/CONTRAST WITH 
PAKISTAN 
In 1974, India conducted a nuclear test that it termed a „peaceful nuclear 
explosion‟. However, in 1998, India conducted a full scale nuclear test and 
subsequently claimed to attain nuclear capability which was followed soon after by 
its neighbor, Pakistan, also opting for the same nuclear route. A year later, the draft 
on nuclear doctrine was presented in August 1999 to the Indian Prime Minister and 
the Cabinet and was subsequently released for public debate by the National 
Security Advisory Board. 
 
The nuclear doctrine of India was perhaps the first of its kind among the 
known nuclear weapon states of the world, and India prepared the expansive 
nuclear doctrine document before obtaining capability mentioned in it. This draft, 
with minor alternations, effectively become India's nuclear doctrine on January 4, 
2003 when the Cabinet Committee on Security Affairs (CSA) reviewed the 
operationalisation of India's nuclear doctrine.  The following are some of the 
highlights of India‟s and Pakistan‟s nuclear doctrine on a comparative note.7 
 
 
 India‟s strategic perspective for its nuclear doctrine encompasses wider 
latitude than South Asia in keeping with its strategic potential. Pakistan's 
perspective as presently evident seems to be India-specific. 
 
 India proclaims "no-first-use ' as a matter of principle. Pakistan is averse to 
it and disinclined to give any such guarantees, feeling that a bland „no-first 
use‟ policy invalidates its deterrence advantage against India.  
 
 India‟s nuclear weapons system will be "TRIAD" (land based ballistic 
missiles, sea based assets and air borne platforms). Pakistan‟s current 
capacity in this regard is limited to land based and aircraft delivery 
systems.  
 
 India and Pakistan‟s nuclear doctrines emphasize a 'credible minimum 
deterrent.‟ However, Pakistan‟s capabilities in this direction may be 
questionable.  
 
 India has revised its nuclear doctrine in 2003 by including any chemical, 
biological and nuclear attack on its territory to be responded through 
                                                 
7
 Kapila, Subhash; „India and Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine: A Comparative Analysis‟, Article 
No. 260, New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, September 15, 1999. also, 
available at http://www.ipcs.org/newKashmirLevel2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=573 
&subCatID=null&mod=null , see, also, „Limited War Under the Nuclear Shadow in South 
Asia‟, Article No. 1623, New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 29 January 
2005, available at http://www.ipcs.org/Nuclear_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kV 
alue=1636&issue=1015&  status=article&mod=a; also, see, Tellis, Ashley J; Stability in 
South Asia, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1997, p.77. 
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massive nuclear retaliation. Pakistan has not made any such formulations 
so far.  
 
 India‟s nuclear arsenal will be under civil political control at all times. 
Pakistani's nuclear arsenal will be under de-facto control of the Army 
Chief.  
 
 India will not resort to use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapons state or those not aligned with nuclear weapon powers. 
Pakistan has not made any such explicit pledge in its nuclear policy.  
 
 „Kargil‟(1999) and 'Operation Parakram'(2001-02) crises demonstrated that 
Mutually Assured Destruction deterrence is operating in South Asia, and 
that both sides have fairly recessed redlines for launching a nuclear strike 
on the other side. But it remains unclear how much of their restraint is not 
a fallout of direct deterrence, rather a lack of political will or external 
intervention. 
 
 India and Pakistan seem to be eager to engage in dangerous brinkmanship. 
Elite leadership of both countries are acutely aware of the utility of nuclear 
weapons as a political tool rather than their military implications. 
Provocative statements are being made, often for consumption of domestic 
or third-party audiences, which has the potential of sending mixed signals 
to the adversary. 
 
 On the positive side, recent crises have shown three potentially stabilising 
trends between India and Pakistan: a growing sense of restraint in each 
country's crisis management behavior, growing transparency and openness 
in their strategies, and growing US involvement in crisis resolution. 
 
 The incentives to persist with unconventional and low intensity conflict in 
the form of state-supported terrorism, state-supported insurgency and 
cross-border terrorism are likely to continue at the lower end of the conflict 
spectrum as large scale conventional wars remain risky. This may result in 
conventional deterrence stability even though the stability might be 
construed as „ugly‟ and less than perfect peace. 
 
 
EVOLUTION OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND 
Z.A.BHUTTO 
The key decision whether Pakistan should embark on a 'coherent nuclear program' 
was discussed for the first time in 1963, though its deterrence value was 
emphasized by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto publicly for the first time in 1965.
8
 To quote 
him, "All wars of our age have become total wars and it will have to be assumed 
that a war waged against Pakistan is capable of becoming a total war...and our plan 
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 Refer Bhutto‟s statement in the National Assembly of Pakistan, see, The National 
Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 3( 1-13), May 30, 1974, third session of 1974, pp.304-5. 
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should, therefore, include the nuclear deterrent."
9 
 After China‟s nuclear tests in 
1964, Pakistan was apprehensive that India would go nuclear. Bhutto, who was 
then a member in Ayub Khan‟s cabinet stated, "If India developed an atomic bomb, 
we too will develop one 'even if we have to eat grass or leaves or to remain hungry' 
because there is no conventional alternative to the atomic bomb."
10
 Two aspects of 
his statement are noteworthy-first, its linkage to India, second, his emphasis on 
atomic bomb as the ultimate weapon. 
 
The secession of East Pakistan in 1971 and the subsequent 1974 tests by India 
led to a serious rethinking among Pakistan‟s nuclear security elite which ultimately 
paved the way for paradigm shift in South Asian security enclave. 
 
 
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR COMMAND 
With Pakistan opting for the nuclear weaponisation in the summer of 1998, it also 
established the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) in February 2000 with three 
components: an Employment Control Committee, the Development Control 
Committee and the Strategic Plans Division. Pakistan also set up a nuclear 
regulatory authority to bring proper coordination in its nuclear program. NCA is 
responsible for policy formulation, employment and development control over all 
strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations.  Besides the President, the 
NCA includes foreign affairs, defense and interior ministers, chiefs of all military 
services and heads of strategic organizations. At a review session in November 27, 
2000, the NCA reviewed the strategic and security environment facing Pakistan 
and took important decisions on nuclear policy matters that included, amongst 
others, strategic threat perception, restructuring of the strategic organizations and 
export control mechanisms.
11
 
 
 
PAKISTAN'S THINKING ON NO FIRST USE (NFU) 
Pakistan has thus far shown little interest in the idea of NFU. Perhaps the closest 
Pakistan has officially come to accepting the language of no first use was in the 
summer of 2002 when India and Pakistan confronted each other in the wake of the 
Kaluchak massacre in Jammu and Kashmir. In response to India‟s threats to 
retaliate conventionally to the massacre, Pakistan stated that it would respond 
forcefully in turn, hinting that it was prepared to use nuclear weapons as a first 
choice. Shortly thereafter Islamabad publicly clarified, apparently under US 
pressure, that responding to an Indian attack did not mean nuclear use, presumably 
first use, against India. 
 
                                                 
9
 Bhutto, Z.A; Myth of Realities, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969, p.153. 
10
 Cited in Cheema, Pervez Iqbal; “Nuclear Development in Pakistan: Future Directions”, 
in P.R.Chari et al. Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan, Manohar; Delhi, 1996, 
p.105, also, see, Smruti S. Pattnaik; “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Strategy”, Strategic Analysis, New 
Delhi, January-March 2003, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 94-114. 
11
 See, www.stratfor.com, December 7, 2000; also, see, “Pakistan sets up N-arms 
Command”, The Times of India, New Delhi, November 28, 2000; also, “Musharraf to head 
Pak Nuclear Command”, The Statesman, Kolkata, February 4, 2000. 
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Among non-officials in Pakistan, those who oppose weaponization as well as 
those who support a minimum deterrent would probably support NFU, the former 
as an interim confidence-building measure in the transition to nuclear disarmament 
and the latter in order to keep the nuclear arsenal minimal and to signal moderation 
and restraint. Most prominently, Pervez Hoodbhoy has suggested that India and 
Pakistan should, as part of a bilateral nuclear treaty, agree to a no first use policy. 
Hoodbhoy argues that NFU would actually benefit Pakistan. NFU would be an 
investment in stability and survival. In case of nuclear war, Pakistan would have 
much more to lose than India since New Delhi can inflict much greater nuclear 
damage (and presumably absorb much greater loss).
12
  
 
Pakistani skepticism or opposition to NFU seems to arise from the following 
concerns. In contrast to India, Pakistan‟s thinking on a no first use/first use policy 
is almost completely military-strategic and country specific (India). First of all, as 
in India and elsewhere in the world, there are those in Pakistan who doubt the 
efficacy and practicality of an NFU. Now, the question arises, can Pakistan rely on 
India‟s leadership to abide by a no first use commitment? Also, are there any way 
of verifying in absolute sense that an adversary (India) is committed to no first use? 
 
Secondly, even if NFU were credible, acceptance of it would mean permanent 
Pakistani strategic inferiority and wideing the window of vulnerability. Given 
Pakistan‟s inferiority in conventional forces vis-a-vis India, the threat of first use is 
vital to its (Pakistan‟s) deterrence against India, while the actual use of nuclear 
weapons first may be vital to Pakistan‟s defense and its survival if and when 
deterrence fails. 
 
Thirdly, there is a line of more offensive-minded Pakistani thinking that 
vehemently opposes an NFU. As per this line of reasoning, first use of nuclear 
weapons is intrinsic to Pakistan‟s exploitation of the asymmetrical conventional 
situation in South Asia. Protected under the umbrella of nuclear weapons, Pakistan 
is free to choose sub-conventional conflict with India. For example, in Kashmir 
fearing Pakistan‟s first use, India cannot cross the Line of Control in Kashmir 
valley or the international boundary further south. These  strategists regard 
Pakistan‟s support of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir since the late 1980s, the 
Kargil war in 1999, and the crisis of May-June 2002 as validating the correctness 
of their hypothesis. In spite of Pakistani provocations, as these thinkers surmise, 
India chose not to retaliate across the Line of Control or cross the international 
boundary.  
 
 
PAKISTAN’S FIRST STRIKE OPTION 
In order to maintain 'strategic balance' Pakistan taking note of India‟s 
overwhelming superiority in conventional arms and manpower may be tempted to 
go in for rapid escalation with a first strike option. Pakistan is very likely to 
exercise this option to counter India should the latter pose a serious and credible 
                                                 
12
 Pugwash Meeting No.279, Kanti Bajpai; „No First Use of Nuclear Weapons‟, available at 
www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/bajpai.htm. 
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threat to Pakistan‟s territorial integrity leading to its dismemberment and further 
fragmentation.
13
 Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf while proclaiming to be in 
full control of his nation's strategic assets did not hesitate to threaten India to use 
nuclear weapons in the event of latter violating the "Line of Control or the 
international border."
14
 In this context, it is worth mentioning the comments made 
by General Khalid Kidwai, Head of the Strategic Plan Division of the Pakistan's 
Army. 
 
"Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In case, deterrence fails, they will be 
used, if, 
 
a. India attacks Pakistan and conquer a large part of its territory(space threshold) 
 
b. India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces(military threshold) 
 
c. India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan(economic threshold) 
 
India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large internal 
subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization)"
15
 
 
 
Pakistan, however, is acutely aware of profound asymmetry in military 
balance in South Asia. Even Pakistan resorting to a limited war with salami slicing 
tactics have the potential of backfire. In the words of General Jehangir Karamat, a 
former Chief of Army of Pakistan, "Pakistan accepts the imbalance inherent in the 
equation with India and will not seek to match capabilities. Pakistan, will, 
therefore, modernize and upgrade its military power in carefully selected areas so 
that its deterrent and defense capability are not degraded and it never faces a 
scenario of overwhelming strategic superiority from India. This deterrence is the 
best guarantee of stability because an unacceptable imbalance can have serious 
implications."
16
 According to Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan‟s deterrence can be 
further augmented by its decision to assemble rapidly a small nuclear force, to 
diversify weapons by using designs that rely on both uranium and plutonium, to 
develop wide ranging missile programs, and to take steps to miniaturise nuclear 
                                                 
13
 „India's Nuclear Command to be in place‟, The Times of India, New Delhi, India, May 
23, 2002. 
14
 „Pakistan's Nuclear Gamble: A Deadly Ploy‟, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
January 17, 2003, New Delhi, available at www.ipcs.org. 
15
 Lieutenant General Sardar Lodhi, F.S; (Retd; Pakistan Army). „Pakistan‟s Nuclear 
Doctrine‟, Pakistan Defense Journal, 1999. See, also, Brigadier Ismat, Saeed; (Retd; 
Pakistan Army), „Strategy for Total Defense: A Conceptual Nuclear Doctrine‟, Pakistan 
Defense Journal, March 2000, also, See, Zafar Iqbal Cheema; „Pakistan‟s Nuclear Use 
Doctrine and Command and Control‟ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. 
Wirtz. Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, And 
Chemical Weapons , London: Cornell University Press, 2000. 
16
 General Jehangir Karamat; „South Asian Stability- A Pakistan Perspective‟, Pugwash 
Meeting No.277, Pugwash Group on South Asian Security, Geneva, Switzerland, 
November 1-3, 2002.  
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warheads.
17
 To supplement this line of thinking, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal emphasizes 
more on capability and less on the number of warheads. According to him, “In the 
present strategic scenario, Pakistan possesses enough strategic weaponry…. to 
provide it with a minimum nuclear deterrence. The basis of this perception is that 
in nuclear deterrence, parity between opponents is not based on numerical equality 
of the number of nuclear delivery systems, or of the number of warheads or in the 
yield of megatons available to each opponent. Parity requires assured destruction 
capability.”18 
 
Pakistan‟s interest in first use may in part be supported by a calculation that 
there are first uses of nuclear weapons against India that would not necessarily 
invite nuclear retaliation. Stephen P. Cohen, an internationally renowned security 
analyst, suggests that the Pakistani army has conceived of an escalation ladder.
19
 
Four of these possible scenarios involve the threat of first use or actual first use:  
 
 Private and public warnings to India not to move its forces threateningly 
 
 A demonstration explosion on Pakistani territory to deter India from a 
conventional attack 
 
 The use of a “few” nuclear weapons on Pakistani territory against intruding 
Indian forces 
 
 Nuclear strikes against “critical” Indian military targets, preferably in areas 
with low population and without much by way of infrastructure.  
 
Of these four, according to Cohen, the first two could well avoid Indian 
retaliation altogether since they would be carried out inside Pakistan and would not 
target Indian assets. The second two, Pakistani planners might calculate, would be 
more provocative but might still not cause India to unleash a full scale retaliatory 
strike. 
 
In this context, Shireen Mazari argues that, “the first generation of nuclear 
weapons that Pakistan would deploy would have large CEP (circular error 
probability)-that is, would not be too accurate, therefore, at least initially Pakistan 
would have to evolve a counter-value strategy: That is, targeting, Indian economic, 
leadership and population centers rather than hardened military targets.”20 
 
                                                 
17
 Cheema, Zafar Iqbal; „Pakistan‟s Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control‟, in 
Peter R.Lavoy, Scot D.Sagan and James J.Wirtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable: How 
New Powers will Use Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Weapons. London: Cornell University 
Press, 2000. 
18
 Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz; „Reassessing Pakistan‟s Nuclear Strategy‟, available at 
http://www.defencejornal.com/2001/july/reaassening.htm. 
19
 Cohen, Stephen P; The Pakistan Army, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.177-
79. 
20
 „Formulating a Rational Strategic Doctrine‟, 1999, a paper available on the website of the 
Pakistan institute of Air Defence Studies, http://www.piads.com.pk 
/users/piads/mazari3html. 
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Mirza Aslam Beg, on the issue of Pakistan‟s nuclear option, says “the strategy 
of deterrence, through flexile response is applicable, based on minimum number of 
weapons What comprises minimal nuclear deterrence, is a national issue, a 
function of the political and military judgment, related to adversary‟s capability.”21 
 
On the assured nature of Pakistan‟s nuclear capability, there are two divergent 
views. Lt.Gen Asad Durrani states, “neither of us relishes the prospect of ever 
using them, especially when the other side could match the response. India could 
consider taking out our nuclear arsenal, to deny us its use- in practice, it is an 
extremely risky proposition. Even on odd weapon that survived the so-called „first 
strike‟, could cause irreparable damage.”22. On the other hand, Ayesha Siddiqa-
Agha argues that “the idea is to ensure that in case of hostilities, Islamabad can 
manage to deliver two to three nuclear weapons to the adversary‟s territory. For the 
time being, this would be achieved with land-based missiles.”23. In the same vein, 
Ejaz Haidar considers “Pakistan is in a better position to challenge India through 
low intensity conflict. This meant that India could now be denied the luxury of 
expanding the conflict and capitalizing on the conventional symmetries.”24 
 
 
VIABILITY OF LIMITED WAR 
Some analysts have raised specter of limited war in the context of India and 
Pakistan going nuclear due to miscalculation and misperception. Even limited war, 
in conventional sense, between India and Pakistan can rapidly escalate in to nuclear 
conflict. Traditionally, a limited war is likely to have the following key features. 
 
1. It is likely to be limited in a geographical sense, although in terms of numbers 
of personnel involved, types of weapons used and duration of conflict,  it might 
be unlimited in scope and actual use.  
 
2. It is also likely to be limited in terms of its objectives within a strategic space 
using calibrated use of force, i.e., between initiating an armed conflict and an 
all-out war. 
 
3. It may be limited from the perspectives of the initiator of the conflict, though 
this may not necessarily be the case with the defender.  
 
 
                                                 
21
 „Deterrence, Defence and Development‟, 2001, available at 
http://www.piads.com.pk/users/piads/beg2.html. 
22
 „Doctrinal Doublespeak‟, Paper presented at Pugwash Meeting no.280, Avoiding an 
India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation, Lahore, Pakistan, March 11-12, 2003, available at: 
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/sa/march2003/pakistan2003-durrani.htm. 
23
 Siddiqa-Agha, Ayesha. „Nuclear Navies‟, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol.56, No.5, 
2000. 
24
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However, four factors can turn any conventional conflict, however, 'limited' in 
nature, in to acquiring a nuclear dimension.
25
  
 
a. The politico-military objectives which India considers limited, might be 
deemed unlimited and unacceptable by Pakistan. Islamabad plans to use 
nuclear weapons in the event of a deep military offensive by India. How 'deep' 
would be deep enough for India to obtain its objective, and how 'deep' would 
be too much for Pakistan to absorb, is vague and unclear and will always 
remain so. Issue of extent of loss of territory, image, legitimacy, are important. 
 
b. Pakistan's military has shown a greater inclination towards a possible use of 
nuclear weapon. In Pakistan, nuclear command and control are exclusively in 
the hands of the military. Faced with significant conventional asymmetry and 
seeming evidence of a conventional attack by India, Pakistan‟s decision makers 
may be tempted to threaten the first use of nuclear weapons. 
 
 
c. In the case of India and Pakistan, inadequate command and control structures, 
deficient early warning arrangements and perceptions about a doubtful capacity 
to launch a retaliatory "second strike" send mixed signals which enhance the 
risk of a nuclear exchange.  
 
d. A possible reappraisal of India's operational doctrine can further encourage 
Pakistan to take recourse to atomic weapons even in conventional warfare. 
 
In this context, it is worth noting, analyst Bharat Karnad‟s „Sialkot Grab‟ 
published in the inaugural issue of Center for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), 
Army 2020. Karnad visualizes “India cutting off a thirty mile deep swathe of 
territory all along the border, threatening Pakistan's center of gravity located in the 
urban centers at around that depth. His assessment is that this would not entail a 
nuclear war since it would not threaten Pakistan's survival.  Since Indian 
mechanized forces would be within fallout distance of urban concentrations and 
Pakistani forces, Pakistan would also be deprived of nuclear targets. Indian 
deterrence would preclude city busting as an option.”26 Karnad‟s thesis is that 
success in a nuclear confrontation is predicated on confronting the adversary with 
impossibly tough choices he cannot risk taking. There are practical problems with 
the 'Sialkot Grab' scheme of fighting a limited war. The area encompassed in the 
thirty mile deep stretch would be quite inhospitable like the US finds areas outside 
its 'green zones' in Iraq. Since it is densely populated, it could lead to several 
Fallujas. Collateral damage resulting from conventional war would also be 
considerable, thereby providing the rationale for Pakistan to up the ante. Contrary 
                                                 
25
 See, Albright, David; „Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex‟, October 2001, 
www.isis-online/publications/terrorism/stanleypaper.html. Also, see, Landau Network. 
http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet  and cotta@mi.infn.it, see, Sumit Ganguly and Kent 
Biringer; „Nuclear Crisis-Stability in South Asia‟, in Lowell Dittmer, eds, South Asia's 
Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China, New York, M.E.Sharpe, 2005, 
p.32, also see, Rajain Arpit, ibid, No.2, p.90. 
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 Ahmad, Firdaus; „Pakistan‟s Possible Nuclear Game Plan‟, Institute of Peace and 
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to Karnad‟s thinking, the Indian flirtation with Pakistan's self-defined nuclear 
threshold is likely to push the conflict up in the escalatory ladder.
27
  
 
ISSUE OF NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL AND HOTLINE 
On the crucial issue of nuclear command and control in Pakistan nuclear 
establishment, the key component is who actually is in charge. According to 
Lt.Gen (Retd) Sardar F.S.Lodi, the following basic guidelines have to met in this 
regard.
28
 
 
 The final orders to use nuclear weapons must come from the highest 
executive authority in the country 
 
 The decision must be based on a deteriorating military situation after the 
enemy‟s conventional attack is likely to break through or has already 
breached the main defence line. 
 
 In case of a pre-emptive strike, it must be ensured that the enemy was 
preparing to launch a nuclear attack, which could cripple Pakistan‟s 
nuclear ability to strike back.   
 
Some of Lodi‟s other recommendations are: (a) „Our standard of 
communication from the Chief Executive right down to the missile launch pad and 
the air base concerned must be perfect and not be susceptible to interruption at all 
times.(b) Intelligence gathering agencies must be able to provide accurate, up-to-
date and timely information about enemy‟s additional troop deployments and likely 
intentions. (c) Our final decision to employ the nuclear option must be based 
entirely on the security and integrity of the country, when other conventional 
means of defence have proved inadequate.(d) Our close friends and allies abroad 
must be kept abreast of the latest situation on the ground and eventually the urgent 
requirement to employ nuclear weapons.(e) It must be kept in mind that the nuclear 
option would be a weapon of last resort which may eventually produce no winners 
or losers and must therefore be employed with the greatest of care and caution after 
discussing all the pros and cons of the situation, its impact in the region and beyond 
and its international ramifications.‟29 
 
Another aspect related to Pakistan‟s nuclear doctrine is the issue of 'Hot Line' 
that has restarted among the leaders at the highest level in both Islamabad and New 
Delhi following a 20-year gap in 1997 is in disuse now. Although some movement 
has been made in this regard during the June 19-20, 2004 meeting at the foreign 
secretaries level, yet no firm time table been set as to when the Hot Lines might be 
activated and become operational. According to Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, Professor of 
Physics at the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan,  
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 See, Ibid, No.24. 
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 Lodi, Lt.Gen.(Retd) Sardar F.S.; „Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine‟, available at 
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"Should a nuclear war occur, it may well be that the order is not given by the 
Chief Executive or the Prime Minister or whoever. That decision may be taken 
by a Brigadier, who will decide whether you and I live or die. Any missiles 
fired by India or Pakistan would take four to eight minutes to hit its target. This 
means both countries are prepared to launch a nuclear strike on the basis of a 
warning. In a few hundred seconds, the credibility of the warning must be 
gauged. Is it the blip on the radar screen really a missile? If so, is it, likely to be 
carrying a nuclear warhead. An alert must then be flashed to the strategic 
command center.  And, if necessary, a launch order transmitted to the missile 
site."
30
 
 
It is hoped that in the near future, a decision to activate Hot Line at the highest 
level be taken as has been done already at the area commander level along the 
entire stretch of India-Pakistan border.  
 
 
POSSIBILITY OF THREATS OR DIVERSION OF FISSILE MATERIALS 
Like in any nuclear weapon state, multiple vulnerabilities exist in a nuclear 
weapons complex.
31
 In the case of Pakistan, it is possible that groups or individuals 
may violate security rules for a variety of reasons, including profit making, settling 
a vendetta, or religious or ideological motives. Rogue elements may try to gain 
control over sensitive items for their own use or to transfer these items to another 
state or to other non-state actors for financial or ideological reasons. A special 
concern is that Pakistan, as its history suggests, may suffer another military coup at 
some point of time. A new leadership, in that case, can be expected to place a high 
priority on seizing the country's nuclear assets. 
 
The threat of theft or diversion of fissile material or nuclear weapons falls into 
three general areas: 
 
 Outsider Threat--The possibility that armed individuals or groups from 
outside a facility gain access and steal nuclear weapons, weapons 
components or fissile material. 
 
 Insider Threat--The possibility that individuals who work inside the 
facility will remove fissile material, nuclear weapons, or weapons 
components without proper authorization. 
 
 Insider/Outsider Threat--The possibility that insiders and outsiders 
conspire together in connivance to obtain fissile materials, weapons, or 
weapon components. 
 
If Pakistan suffers extreme instability or civil war, additional threats to its 
strategic nuclear assets are also possible. This may happen, as Muthiah Allagappa 
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comments, due to military‟s inherent struggle to attain legitimacy and in “military‟s 
inability to construct an acceptable political framework for the management of the 
state, including the acquisition and exercise of state power”32 and in facilitating the 
emergence of a viable civil society.: 
 
 Loss of Central Control of Storage Facilities--Clear lines of 
communication code and control over weapons, weapons components, and 
fissile material may be broken or lost entirely. 
 
 Coup--In the most extreme case, a coup takes place and the new regime 
attempts to gain control of the entire nuclear complex. A The New York 
Times report suggested US policy makers envisioning alternatives for 
Pakistan after Musharraf. Under this scenario, the Vice-Chief of the Army, 
Ahsan Saleem Hyat, take over from General Musharraf as head of the 
military and former banker Mohammedmian Soomro installed as president, 
with General Hyat wielding most of the power.
33
 In this context, Sydney J. 
Freedberg writes, “He is just the latest leader to stand precariously atop 
Pakistan's three ever-shifting tectonic plates - generals, politicians and 
mullahs. Sooner, not later, he will lose his footing. To understand what 
might happen next, it's important to understand the three major power 
centres at work in Pakistan."
34
 It is also possible that foreign government(s) 
may intervene to prevent hostile entity from seizing the strategic nuclear 
assets. 
 
In the current situation, Pakistan must also increasingly worry that experts 
from the nuclear complex could steal sensitive information or assist nuclear 
weapons programs of other countries or terrorist groups. The information could 
include highly classified nuclear weapons data, exact storage locations of weapons 
or fissile material, access control arrangements, or other sensitive, operational 
details about these weapons. 
 
 
ISSUE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
There is no reference in Pakistan‟s nuclear doctrine as to the appropriate disaster 
control system should a potential accident does occur. Pakistan, at the present time, 
does not have anything even close to the capabilities of managing a nuclear 
disaster, should it occur either from a nuclear first strike or from a retaliatory strike 
by the adversary. 
 
In a chilling report published by Britain based NEW SCIENTSTS in 2002, it 
was reported that a massive loss of men and materials would occur should a 
nuclear exchange take place between India and Pakistan.  As per this report, "At 
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least 2.9 million people would be killed and another 1.4 million severely injured. 
This report is based on 10 Hiroshima type bombs, 5 in India (Bangalore, Mumbai, 
Kolkata, New Delhi, Chennai) and 5 in Pakistan (Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, 
Islamabad, Rawalpindi) India side with an estimated 1.5 million dead and 900,000 
injured. And, from Pakistan side; 1.2 million dead and 600, 000 injured. If the 
bomb explodes on the ground instead of in the air, resulting radioactive dust could 
kill more people. Due to prevailing winds from west to east, India would incur 
more casualties than Pakistan. This is just ten bombs, which is 1/10
th
 of estimated 
number of nuclear bombs both countries are believed to have possessed."
35
 
 
Another report provided even a scarier picture. "Nuclear exchange could kill 
up to 12 million people at one stroke plus injury up to 7 million. Even a so-called ' 
limited war' would have cataclysmic effect overhauling hospitals across Asia and 
requiring vast foreign assistance to battle radioactive contamination, famine and 
disease. More deaths would occur later caused by urban firestones, ignited by the 
heat of a nuclear exchange, deaths from longer term radiation, or the disease and 
starvation expected to spread."
36
 
 
In this regard, India's Home (Interior) Ministry is currently raising eight 
battalions to tackle natural disasters and combat nuclear, biological and chemical 
warfare. In all likelihood, Pakistan is expected to follow India‟s path in having a 
National Emergency Response Force battalions so as to be deployed  in strategic 
locations under the supervision of the Director-General of Civil Defense should 
such consequence management contingencies arise. 
 
 
PAKISTAN’S CURRENT MISSILE CAPABILITY AND INDIA’S COLD 
START STRATEGY 
According to Jane Intelligence Review, Pakistan has nearly completed 
development of a solid fuel missile that could strike key Indian cities from deep 
within Pakistan territory through Ghauri-series of liquid propelled missiles in an 
offensive operation and Shaheen-series weapons as defensive measures.  
 
On May 24, 2002, (and very recently on July 26, 2007), Pakistan also tested 
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Hatf V (Ghauri) missiles that has a range of 
1,500 kilometers (1,000 miles) that can hit most populous cities of Northern, 
Central and Western India. The father of the Pakistan bomb, Dr. A. Q. Khan, in a 
declaration has asserted that Ghauri missiles could "wipe out thrice, all the big 
cities of India."
37
 On June 4, 2004, Pakistan also successfully test-fired Hatf-V and 
Ghauri-1. In addition to it, Pakistan is now equipped with ballistic missiles like:  
Abdali-1, Hatf-I, Ghaznavi (SRBM), Shaheen series of MRBM(750-2500 km) and 
Ghauri series  of MRBMs and IRBMs ranging between 1,300 to 3,500 km. India , 
on the other hand, on June 13, 2004, has successfully test fired Brahmos, the 
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supersonic cruise missiles that can travel at Mach 2.823 and which has been 
configured to be launched from either land, ship, sub-marine and aircraft using 
liquid ramjet technology. Furthermore, India has test fired Agni-III longest-range 
missile successfully on April 12, 2007, which can hit objects from a range of 3000 
miles and thus the entire territorial space of Pakistan (in addition to those of 
China‟s mega metropolis of Beijing and Shanghai) can be within India‟s missile 
range. Agni-III‟s successful test is likely to put additional pressure on Pakistan‟s 
nuclear establishment as the former can claim to have attained minimum credible 
deterrence and which can form crucial component of India‟s nuclear doctrine. In 
coming years, India is also opting for nuclear armed submarines, armed with 
nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, for assured and effective second-strike capabilities 
and nuclear-tipped land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) to provide India a 
definitive strategic edge. In addition, India‟s Armed forces have formulated joint 
war doctrine to ensure that individual combat capabilities of Army, Navy and Air 
Force can come together in the event of war. It remains to be seen whether and 
when Pakistan will match India‟s cruise missile and related capabilities so as not to 
provide its rival a strategic edge.  
 
Similarly, India‟s new Cold Start Strategy that became operational with major 
military exercise VAJRA SHAKTI in May 2005 has been of real concern to 
Pakistan‟s nuclear establishment. Under the Cold Start Strategy, India could 
retaliate with nuclear weapons if its armed forces were subjected to nuclear, 
chemical or biological strikes and this could have profound strategic impact on 
Pakistan‟s nuclear doctrine. Although Cold Start Strategy was in place under the 
North Atlantic alliance, a similar replication in the South Asian context might have 
serious implications thus further endangering the strategic environment of the 
region.  
 
 
TOWARDS A STRATEGIC RESTRAINT REGIME 
Perhaps, what is needed is a level of transparency and credible approach. To 
Pakistan‟s credit, at the October 1998 talks at the foreign minister level, Pakistan 
proposed a framework for what was called a strategic restraint regime.
38
 The 
framework included:  
 
 a non-aggression pact;  
 
 the prevention of a nuclear weapons and ballistic missile race;  
 
 risk reduction mechanisms such as nuclear risk reduction centers;  
 
 avoidance of nuclear conflict;  
 
 formalizing moratoria on nuclear testing;  
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 non-induction of anti-ballistic missile systems and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles; and  
 
 formal nuclear doctrines of minimum deterrent capability.  
 
Pakistan also proposed mutual and balanced reduction of forces in the 
conventional field. India matched these proposals by offering a framework 
consisting of:  
 
 no-first-use pledges;  
 
 agreement on preventing nuclear war, including through accidental or 
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;  
 
 extension of agreements prohibiting attack against nuclear installations;  
 
 advance notification of ballistic missile tests; and  
 
 verification of nuclear related data exchange. 
 
In this context, Michael Kreppon, South Asia strategist at the Washington DC 
based Henry Stimson Center has outlined a viable ten key commandments to 
reduce the risks of nuclear escalation:
39
 
 
 Don‟t change or alter the territorial status quo in sensitive areas by use of 
force 
 
 Avoid nuclear brinkmanship on both sides 
 
 Avoid dangerous and threatening military practice 
 
 Put in place special reassurance measures for ballistic missiles and other 
nuclear forces 
 
 Implement properly mutual and international treaty obligations, risk-
reduction, and confidence-building measures 
 
 Agree on verification arrangements, including intrusive and comprehensive 
monitoring 
 
 Establish reliable lines of communication, between political leaders and 
between military leaders 
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 Establish conventional and reliable command and control arrangements as 
well as intelligence-gathering capabilities to know what the other side is up 
to, especially in a crisis 
 
 Keep working hard on these arrangements.  Improve them.  Don‟t take 
anything for granted 
 
 Hope for plan dumb luck or divine intervention 
 
Along this line, Hassan Askari Rizvi and Rajesh M.Basrur
40
 have suggested 
eight measures, which in their viewpoint could substantially enhance the safety and 
security of nuclear facilities in India and Pakistan: 
 
1. Track down the groups and the individuals engaged in violent activities 
and terrorism 
 
2. Extensive surveillance of the borders and coastlines to contain the 
movement of goods and people 
 
3. More use of modern technology to enhance the physical protection of 
nuclear weapons, material and installations 
 
4. Thorough scrutiny of the personnel handling the nuclear programmes of 
the two countries 
 
5. Acquisition of latest technologies for the transportation of fissile and 
radioactive materials 
 
6. Highly trained manpower may be employed for the protection of nuclear 
facilities 
 
7. Extensive coordination network amongst all the set-ups dealing with the 
nuclear infrastructure and in addition, there should be an independent body 
to ensure an oversight and accountability 
 
8. Finally, a disaster management body may be established to handle a 
security alarm systems, and the actual nuclear-terrorist incidents and 
emergencies 
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CONCLUSION 
In the shadow of Pakistan‟s nuclear doctrine lies the perennial issue of Kashmir 
which is the bone of contention between India and Pakistan since 1947. Since 
volatility over Kashmir may yet provide a flash point , that possibility may induce 
both countries to come to a negotiating table and to opt for nuclear deterrence and 
quick implementation of  'enforceable and verifiable' confidence building measures 
which may include simultaneous signing of CTBT and other international 
safeguards and ushering in of citizens diplomacy. The statement made by Gen. 
Pervez Musharraf on December18, 2003 to be flexible on Kashmir issue and be 
ready to bend on his UN Kashmir baggage by keeping aside UN Security Council 
Resolution is a welcome sign and should be explored further. Elaborating his 
vision for the resolution of the long tangled Kashmir problem, Musharraf outlined 
a four-step approach. It involves recognition of the centrality of Kashmir for the 
settlement of all disputes between India and Pakistan, commencement of a dialogue 
on that basis, elimination of solutions not acceptable to India, Pakistan and people 
of Kashmir, and initiating the process for finding a solution acceptable to all 
parties.
41
 
 
Along with it, the following confidence-building measures at the non-military 
level could be pursued in right earnest.  
 
 Unofficial dialogue through Track-II should be encouraged by the two 
governments to assist official-level talks between India and Pakistan 
 
 Commerce and trade such as having a Free Trade Agreement, Granting 
Most  Favored Nations status, Open Visa Regime, Evolving a common 
currency, etc 
 
 Along with Lahore-Amritsar route, bus service between Srinagar and 
Muzafarabad linking both Indian and Pakistan sides of the Line of Control 
across the Kashmir valley that began in April 2005 to continue for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
Similarly, on Siachen glacier along the Kashmir front, the world's highest 
battlefield, CBM talks could be initiated geared toward demilitarization and firm 
commitment made by both India and Pakistan to stop aggressive maneuvers, avoid 
lateral movement of troops on the glacier and declare Siachen as a mountain of 
peace. In this context, a positive development has taken place on April 6, 2007, 
when the Indian Defence Secretary and his Pakistan counterpart met in Rawalpindi 
as part of the fourth round of Composite Dialogue process. Under this ongoing 
dialogue, Pakistan has softened its stance from total opposition to authentication of 
troops. It has offered India a package deal under which it (Pakistan) has agreed to 
the Indian demand but has asked India for a time bound withdrawal of its troops to 
the pre-conflict positions as a quid-pro-quo.
42
 
                                                 
41
 See, Indian Express, New Delhi, December 19, 2003; also, see, The Hindu, Chennai, 
December 19, 2003. 
42
 See, www.rediff.com, April 6, 2007. 
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Second, India's ex-foreign minister, Mr.K.Natwar Singh's proposal to evolve 
and study the feasibility of a common nuclear doctrine between India, Pakistan and 
China in order to bring peace and stability to the region could be explored further. 
Third, CBMs and related negotiations including the feasibility of common pipeline 
between Iran, Pakistan and India for enhanced energy cooperation (that was agreed 
upon by Prime minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and President Pervez Musharraf in 
New Delhi on April 16-18, 2005, and again during September 15-16, 2006 in 
Havana, Cuba at the Non-Alignment Movement summit), could be pursued more 
aggressively.  Another measure that could be tried was a concerted effort on the 
part of the permanent members of the UN Security Council to act as honest 
facilitators “to help in ushering a common, strategic dialogue and language on arms 
control in South Asia”43 and foster open communications among the parties 
concerned. But then, the concept of nuclear deterrence for two South Asian rival 
countries with deep rooted historical animosities and regional ambitions might be 
an uphill task unlike the case of the United States and former Soviet Union during 
the Cold War years when both the countries stayed broadly within the perimeter of 
deterrence. With the shaping of nuclear doctrines of Pakistan and India in place, it 
was hoped a peace constituency could hopefully take firm hold in South Asia in 
making sure the proactive peace process currently underway between India and 
Pakistan was irreversible.  
 
Six elements are critical to sustain this process of dialogue.
44
 One, preservation 
of agreements and CBMs ( military and non-military) instituted so far between 
India and Pakistan. Two, promoting resolution of disputes so that peace process 
gains momentum into a conflict resolution mode. Three, a problem-solving 
proactive approach be applied by both sides. Four, principle of reciprocity and 
goodwill to guide the dialogue process. Five, political contacts sufficiently at high 
level to the highest level are needed to discuss issues critically and keep the 
engagement process moving. Six, there is a need to evolve a convergent vision for 
a future of peace and cooperation in the entire South Asian region.  What is more 
important in this regard is the perception of risk which appear to be only limited 
regional perceptions of the shared bilateral risks of nuclear war and avoidance of 
possible catastrophe.
45
 In the short to intermediate term, viable solution(s) has to be 
evolved for solving the various, bilateral intractable issues so as to have saleability 
and acceptability by all stakeholders. There is also a compelling need to recalibrate 
other national strategic priorities - national defense, Kashmir, convert „trust deficit‟ 
into „trust surplus‟, etc.46 The issue is complicated further by the profound 
asymmetry between Pakistan's obsession with India in its security thinking and 
India's focus on a range of security imperatives of which Pakistan is but one. 
                                                 
43
 Statement by Ambassador Akram, Munir; Pakistan in the Conference on Disarmament, 
August 19, 1999, available at http://www3.itu.int/pakistan/CD-
Indian%20Nuclear%20Doctrine-19%20August%2099.htm. 
44
 See, Maleeha Lodhi, „Nuclear Cloud over South Asia‟, The Times of India, New Delhi, 
May 1, 2006. 
45
 See, Shaun Gregory, „A Formidable Challenge: Nuclear Command and Control in South 
Asia‟, Disarmament Diplomacy, The Acronym Institute, Issue No.54, February 2001. 
46
 See, Shaukat Aziz‟s statement, „Result-oriented Talks must‟, The Triune, April 4 , 2007, 
www.tribuneindia.com. 
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